Russia’s entry onto the Syrian battlefield was an avoidable development, a chess play to the game of checkers that has been US policy in the Middle East.
As foreseeable as the lights of an oncoming train, Russia has doubled down on its sole Arab ally, Bashar Assad, and complicated enormously the US effort to counter both ISIS and the Syrian dictator.
This week, within less than 48 hours of a meeting between President Obama and Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the United Nations, the Russian Federation Council rubber-stamped the initiation of hostilities on Syrian territory. Moscow’s plan in Syria, notwithstanding the professed confusion of the Obama administration, is less about ISIS or developing a partnership with the West to counter the group, and more about tipping the balance of power toward Assad.
And indeed, that was obvious given, according to Supreme Allied Commander General Philip M. Breedlove, that the Russians have in place air defense systems clearly geared toward interdicting US airpower in strategic locations and that the very first Russian airstrikes reportedly hit not ISIS targets, but US-allied Syrian forces opposed to Assad.
How did we get here and what is to be done? Look first to Ukraine for an explanation of why Putin felt emboldened to enter the Syrian fray. The Obama administration (and much of the European Union) accepted Putin’s annexation of Crimea, and has tolerated near constant violations of the Minsk Accords intended to limit Russia’s appetite. Despite recommendations from within his own administration, the President has consistently vetoed suggestions that the United States should arm Ukraine to defend itself.
Finding little resistance to his predations in Ukraine, the Russian leader began to look further afield, first testing American resolve inside the negotiations that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, better known as the Iran Deal. In the final days of the negotiations, Tehran, with Russian backing, upped the ante repeatedly, demanding an end to pressure on conventional arms sales and missile deliveries. No surprise then that in the immediate aftermath of the deal, Russia agreed to deliver the controversial and oft-delayed advanced S-300 surface to air missile system to Iran.
Meanwhile, things were going badly for Putin crony Assad, and in early September there was even talk of him losing Damascus to opposition forces. So, in the face of quiet and not-so-quiet warnings from Washington, Putin decided to take control of the Syrian theater. From Moscow’s perspective, why not?
Indeed, recent days have seen US positions evolve to the point of calling for “deconfliction” in the joint fight against ISIS. Moscow answered quickly, defining deconfliction, within an hour of commencing airstrikes, as the end of all US operations over Syria. How will the President respond?
On the one hand, it is tempting to recommend that the United States simply take out the airfields and facilities now being used by Russian forces. But Obama wouldn’t do that even before the Russians were on the ground; why do it now and risk confrontation? And even the most ardent of hawks must hesitate before calling for direct Russian-American military confrontation over Syria.
So where does it end? That too seems painfully obvious: Russia is promising a “solution” to the refugee crisis plaguing Europe, an Iranian-Iraqi-Russian sponsored return to “stability” in Syria, another chance to wash our hands of the pesky problem of who would lead Syria should Assad fall.
The wheels are already turning in the halls of government from Washington to Berlin. Sure the President has said Assad must go, but red lines can be redrawn. Sure Washington had a train and equip policy for the Syrian opposition, but that’s a disaster. Sure Assad has killed upwards of 200,000 of his own people, but few on team Obama see that as a call to action.
Perhaps one other question to ask is how will a Russian-Iranian compact to crush the Sunnis of Syria deliver anything like lasting stability? And another: Where will Russian troops go next? Estonia? Latvia? Lithuania? Why, Putin surely is asking himself, not?
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