Today, The Wall Street Journal reports that Chinese nuclear experts have upped their assessment of North Korea’s nuclear weapons capabilities—they estimate that Pyongyang now has an arsenal of 20 warheads, which could double by the end of next year. The assessment was shared with American (non-governmental) experts at a meeting hosted by the Chinese Institute of International Studies, a research organization affiliated with the Chinese Foreign Ministry.
According to the Journal, “the Chinese estimates reflect growing concern in Beijing over North Korea’s weapons program and what they see as US inaction while President Barack Obama focuses on a nuclear deal with Iran.” Such concern should not be taken at face value.
It has long been clear that Beijing does not consider reining in the nuclear program to be one of its primary interests in North Korea. If the reverse were true, China would have cooperated closely with the United States and its allies to denuclearize the Korean peninsula. Instead, China worked to water down UN Security Council resolutions, flouted sanctions, and may have facilitated illegal North Korean arms exports to the likes of Iran.
So why is China now sounding the alarm? Off the bat, two possible explanations come to mind.
First, Beijing may truly be concerned, but not, per se, about North Korea’s nukes. Americans and others have long argued that the advancement of the North’s nuclear program could lead to nuclear proliferation throughout the region. China may finally be taking that warning seriously.
In particular, China may be worried about Japan. Beijing has now seen heightened tensions with Tokyo sustain over a period of years; it has seen a number of dangerous encounters at sea; it sees an assertive Shinzo Abe, Tokyo’s strongest prime minister in years (decades?), apparently overcoming Japanese political paralysis; and it sees a Japanese government committed to preserving the country’s nuclear power industry despite significant opposition. Beijing may have assessed that a Japanese decision to “go nuclear,” while not in the immediate offing, is not so far-fetched, especially under Abe. Addressing the North Korean nuclear conundrum—or at least creating a process that gives the appearance of doing so— would deprive Tokyo of a rationale for pursuing its own nuclear weapons program.
Second, Beijing may be looking for renewed leverage over Washington. During the six-party talks process, which was active between 2003 and 2009, and for which Beijing acted as convener, Washington worried about policies (like arms sales to Taiwan) that would upset Beijing because the United States needed China’s “help” with North Korea. With the discontinuation of the six-party talks and with the Obama administration’s adoption of a policy of “strategic patience,” Beijing lost this bit of leverage.
Now, with China and the United States increasingly at odds in a number of issue areas, especially with respect to the East and South China Seas, Beijing may be looking for new ways to shape American behavior in Asia. China’s new warning about North Korea’s nuclear weapons program may be aimed at spurring Washington to embrace a renewal of the six-party talks or a similar process—not to solve the nuclear question, but to shift Washington into the position of supplicant vis-à-vis Beijing.
A North Korea armed with nuclear weapons is a serious problem, and one that has grown worse in recent years. The administration should be considering a new approach, as Pyongyang has simply expanded its arsenal while Washington exercised “strategic patience.” Even so, Chinese warnings about North Korean nukes must be taken with a grain of salt. In raising the issue, Beijing has its own motives and its own goals, which may very well not include denuclearizing the peninsula.
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