Ever since President Franklin Delano Roosevelt met Saudi King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud on board the USS Quincy, the United States and Saudi Arabia have been staunch partners: not even the 1973 oil embargo or the participation of 15 Saudi hijackers in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks disrupted cooperation between Washington and Riyadh. However, Saudi concern about US outreach to Iran, coupled with growing sectarian tension in the Middle East, has eroded trust and put bilateral relations in crisis. American policymakers can no longer take for granted Saudi support for US policies.
With Saudi leadership soon passing to a new generation, and Saudi distrust of US intentions high, whoever enters the Oval Office in January 2017 will preside over a fundamentally different relationship. To chart future relations, the new president should consider these five questions.
1.) What is the future of the US-Saudi energy relationship?
Saudi Arabia has the largest reserve production capacity in the world and the kingdom’s influence over the energy market is unmatched. This influence often becomes a tool of foreign policy. Saudi Arabia increased oil production to keep prices stable following both Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the 2011 NATO action against Muammar Qadhafi’s Libya. More recently Saudi Arabia’s decision to flood the market decreased oil prices, hurting Russia and Iran’s oil-dependent economies while undercutting the burgeoning shale industry in North America and perhaps China.
Increases in American oil and natural gas production have changed the basis of US-Saudi energy relations, however. In 2003, 30% of Saudi oil exports went to the United States. Today, only 8% do. In 2009, Asia surpassed North America as the leading market for Saudi oil. Saudi leaders are reportedly concerned that declining US demand for Saudi oil could alter US interests in the Middle East. What should US-Saudi energy relations look like? Is there a space for economic partnership beyond the production—and consumption—of crude?
2.) What is the future of US-Saudi military ties?
Since 1953, the US Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia has promoted Saudi technical capacity and regional security. But amidst domestic discontent with the American presence, the United States redeployed its air operations command to Qatar in 2003, leaving only a small US training presence in Saudi Arabia. Today, Saudi Arabia is among the largest recipients of US military hardware, the second largest importer of arms worldwide, and the kingdom outspends other Persian Gulf states on military material both in real terms, and as a percentage of GDP. Saudi investments have focused on its air force and missile defense systems however, not on naval or ground force capacity.
Saudi Arabia is a key member of both the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): it hosts the GCC’s Peninsula Shield land force and is slated to command the proposed joint Arab League force. A collective GCC or Arab League force may increase autonomy of action, but might decrease US leverage; the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen is a case in point. President Bill Clinton’s Cooperative Defense Initiative and President George W. Bush’s Gulf Security Dialogue both aimed to promote the GCC’s collective security efforts, but extensive arms sales did not equate to interoperability or functionality. Should the United States expand its defense relations with Saudi Arabia? If so, how can the United States ensure that an increase in Saudi military power promotes regional stability? How will a future US president balance Saudi efforts to deter Iran with commitment to ensure Israel’s qualitative military edge?
3.) Should the United States support Saudi democratic reform and human rights?
Saudi Arabia gets a lot of bad press for its poor human rights record. Critics point to the kingdom’s restrictive laws toward women, including the prohibition against women driving and the guardianship system, under which any woman requires her male guardian’s permission to marry or divorce, seek education or employment, travel, or even open a bank account. But Saudi Arabia’s poor human rights record extends beyond women’s rights. Saudi authorities continue to implement harsh punishments, including flogging, amputation, and public executions. The recent case of blogger Raif Badawi is but one example. Torture, sectarian discrimination, restrictions on religious freedom, and exploitation of migrant workers remain problems.
US policy toward Saudi Arabia has favoured stability, and US criticism of internal Saudi policy is generally muted. Will the next president continue the policy of quiet critique, or will he or she favor a more proactive stance against authoritarian restrictions on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law? Should US allies share our values, or only our goals?
4.) How should the United States assess Saudi Arabia’s radicalism problem?
Saudi Arabia rests upon a compact between the monarchy and conservative religious leaders, some of whom promote a strict Salafi interpretation of Islam that is sometimes used to legitimize violence or terrorism. The US Treasury Department has designated Saudi religious charities like the International Islamic Relief Organization and the al Haramain Foundation as financiers of terrorism. Saudi nationals carried out the highest percentage of suicide attacks on US forces in Iraq, and Saudis are believed to be the leading group of foreign fighters joining the Islamic State.
Beyond simply stopping the funding of terrorism, how can the United States and Saudi Arabia work to counter violent extremism? In 2003 Saudi Arabia began a de-radicalization campaign designed to reintegrate Saudi nationals with links to violent extremist organizations. Fighters who surrender serve their sentence at de-radicalization and rehabilitation centres while developing skills that enable them to return to society. In 2007 Saudi officials reported an 8-9% recidivism rate, although more recent reports have the number closer to 20%. Saudi Arabia has accepted 123 detainees from Guantánamo Bay, making the success of the Saudi program of US interest. How will a future president view the program? Should it continue? Can the United States support its reform and expansion?
5.) Are US and Saudi regional goals aligned?
Saudi goals in the region do not always align with those of the United States. Saudi Arabian mistrust of President Obama’s Iran policy is but one example. Saudi Arabia supports the Palestinian Authority, but it has also at times helped finance its rival, Hamas. In both Pakistan and Syria, the Saudi government and Saudi private charities often prefer to finance armed Islamist forces rather than US-backed ‘moderates.’
The next US president will confront an increasingly unstable region shaken by Saudi-Iranian competition and rivalries between Arab League members. Will a future US president take the Saudi line in Yemen and Syria, or will he or she seek to split the difference or choose sides on a case-by-case basis? Negotiating this tangle will not be easy, but it will be necessary.
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