AEI’s director of Russian studies, Leon Aron, has edited a new volume— to be released at a conference on May 14— on the dynamics of Russian domestic politics titled “Putin’s Russia: How it rose, how it is maintained, and how it might end.” This work looks beyond international sanctions and the war in Ukraine to examine underlying crises in Russia’s political and economic systems that will determine the stability of the Putin regime in the years ahead. Below, Dr. Aron interviews one of the nine leading Russian experts that contributed to the volume, Boris Makarenko, head of the Center for Political Technologies in Moscow, about his chapter on the development of civil society in Russia. For additional information about the volume and the conference where the authors will discuss their findings, check out the event page here.
How would you describe the relationship between civil society and the Putin regime today?
It would be wrong to assume that the Putin regime does not need or ignores Russian civil society. The relationship is much more complicated. Karl Marx said that bourgeoisie begets its own grave-digger, the working class. In the same manner, authoritarian modernizations (that is, state-directed and state-policed modernizations, like those in Singapore or China or in Russia under Peter the Great) beget civil society, and it’s the regime’s choice whether to make it an ally and resource of further development, or let it dig the grave for the obsolete political arrangement.
The Russian regime’s ultimate strategy is to use civil society for its own purposes by keeping it (as well as any private initiative) under the state’s control, which of course is totally incompatible with the notion of civil society as a self-organizing and free institution.
To this end, the regime nurtures loyal and Kremlin-organized civil activity (“imitated civil society”) and goes after any independent action if it has the smallest political tinge. Of course, in between are numerous politically neutral initiatives (i.e. charities, social services, leisure associations) which remain below the “radar” of the state. Neither of the three categories is thriving. “Imitated” civil activity is in most cases a non-starter; “opposition-minded” NGO’s are being hounded as “foreign agents” and otherwise repressed; the “neutral” are surviving.
If you were to name, say, the three most fateful trends in Russian politics and society today, what would they be?
1. Significant tension exists between the stagnating and archaic Russian economy and social policies on one hand, and the impeccably high and stable popularity of the Russian president and high symbolic legitimacy of the regime on the other. (What I mean by symbolic legitimacy is that although many Russians are dissatisfied with government performance, they trust their President as a symbol of unity and guarantor of security, and only some of them hold him responsible for what the bureaucracy does to them.) With no hope of better economic performance on the horizon, Russia will inevitably see these two opposing trends come into conflict; yet, the “besieged fortress” public mentality (that is, the mentality shaped by the alleged threats to Russia from the outside) persists and postpones the obvious.
2. “Pushmi-pullyu policy” of the Putin regime towards civil society and the political domain. The regime “pulls” the loyal segments of the population into its orbit, and even encourages limited electoral pluralism (as long as it does not endanger the regime’s electoral dominance) in order to avoid the public frustration that exploded into the massive protests in 2011-2012. Abiding by this policy, the regime preaches support for “socially-oriented, non-profit NGOs” (that is, defined by the regime as non-political, “neutral” ones), but in fact, does next to nothing to make the “third sector” (i.e., non-profit NGOs) develop from its current small scale.
At the same time, the state “pushes away” all the actors of independent political action by means of, just to name a few, the “foreign agents” law, regulation of the internet, harassment of activists and suppression of independent media.
3. What could be called the “anti-modernity mood.” The regime fears not only “citizens”, but even an environment in which “the culture of participation” may ferment. Blatant anti-Western and anti-liberal propaganda 24/7 on all public TV channels and witch hunts against opposition leaders are supplemented by the encouragement of “archaism” in cultural life. Borrowing the famous Mao Zedong statement, the Russian Minister of Culture formulated the creed of his “cultural policy”: Let a hundred flowers bloom, but we will water only those we like. Taking into account that there’s de facto only one “well” in Russia, the federal money, and “watering cans” are in short supply, it implies a strict government monopoly in the cultural sphere.
Could you outline, very briefly, how each of these trends might be shaping Russia’s future in short or medium term?
The Russian regime’s approach to civil society contradicts the logic of history and even common sense. It remains “workable” due to a combination of two factors: (a) the de facto monopoly of the state in mass media and the electoral arena, and (b) the low level of civil society development. Obviously, this situation cannot last infinitely. “Citizens” will re-emerge, and the poor performance of the government in the socio-economic domain will stimulate change. Having said that, I am hard put to make more specific forecasts.
Should the West care about these developments (after all, they are Russia’s “internal affairs”) and if so, why? Is there anything the global community can do to facilitate Russia’s progress toward democratic self-rule and a modern economy?
What Russian civil society badly lacks, is not only money, but many things money can’t buy: the “know-how” of volunteer work and management, pride in one’s work, the satisfaction of work well done, etc. All of these are lacking at home, and thus here the international community may offer a hand.
Follow AEIdeas on Twitter at @AEIdeas.
from AEI » Latest Content http://ift.tt/1HgNdB0
0 التعليقات:
Post a Comment