AEI director of Russian studies, Leon Aron, has edited a new volume— to be released at a conference on May 14— on the dynamics of Russian domestic politics titled “Putin’s Russia: How it rose, how it is maintained, and how it might end.” This work looks beyond international sanctions and the war in Ukraine to examine underlying crises in Russia’s political and economic systems that will determine the stability of the Putin regime in the years ahead. Below, Dr. Aron asks one of the nine leading Russian experts who contributed to the volume, Kirill Rogov, a senior fellow at the Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, about his chapter on Russian public opinion and Vladimir Putin’s base of support. For additional information about the volume and release event, check out the event page here.
In your essay you talk about a kind of additional boost to President Putin’s ratings which is not directly linked to approval of his policy but instead comes from a sense of solidarity with the president. How much of Putin’s support can be attributed to this effect, and is this unique to the Putin regime?
What I describe in my chapter (I call it the “Delta” effect) is the difference between the share of respondents in opinion polls who approve of the president and the share of respondents saying that things in the country are headed in the right direction. This means that there are people who believe that the country is on the wrong track but still support the leader. One can find this effect in US opinion polling data as well. Conventionally it could be interpreted as partisanship – the support which is not directly dependent on current results of leader’s performance.
The fascinating thing about the Delta effect in Russia (and what makes it different from the US and other democracies) is its huge size and stability. It is about 35% on average through the whole period of Putin’s leadership. In American history we can see a similar difference in the level of the leader’s approval and the level of satisfaction during periods which are usually identified as being influenced by ‘the rally around the flag’ effect. Such was the case, for example, in 2001 in the United States. While under a democracy such episodes are rare and brief, in some authoritarian countries the political process resembles a non-stop rally-round-the-flag.
This is the model of non-democratic popular leadership. Nondemocratic leaders make a special effort to manipulate their country’s institutional arrangements to support high levels of popularity and achieve a super-majority. This is important to them because, as a citizen, it is much more difficult to say that you are against the leader if you know that everybody around you is supporting him. So achieving a super-majority precludes the consolidation of opposition and prevents the elite groups investing in the opposition.
How permanent is the “Delta” effect?
When Putin came to power in 2000, not more than 30% of respondents said they were satisfied with the situation in the country. At the same time about 75% supported the new leader. So the portion of those who supported the leader but not the situation in the country was at 40 points. In 2011 – 2012 Putin’s popularity decreased significantly with this gap hovering around 20 points. This means that the approval rating was much more sensitive to people’s opinion of the current situation in the country during that time. In other words, discontented citizens had become a significant portion of society.
After the annexation of Crimea the super-majority was restored. Once again, people who are not satisfied with something are much more likely to blame anyone but Putin, because they know that everyone supports him.
If you were to name the three most fateful trends in Russian politics and society today, what would they be?
I would highlight two main trends. The first is economic deterioration. And the second is the transition from a soft to a tougher authoritarian regime.
As regards the economy, the situation is better than expected. We do not see a collapse, but a serious gradual deterioration which resembles a depression. And this depression could be much more protracted than people in Russia now suppose.
However, this gives the government room for maneuver. It is extremely important for Putin to build more repressive authoritarian institutions before dissatisfaction in the country achieves the critical level. Confrontation with the West and the war in Ukraine are good excuses for the intense development of such institutions.
How does the Putin regime remain popular given these negative trends?
Another important tool of the regime is propaganda. We tend to disregard it, thinking it to be a phenomenon of the 20th century. But it still works. It is important to follow and to examine what Putin’s propaganda is saying now. And we see that it takes a serious effort to inure public opinion to the prospect of a possible major war. A year ago, after the annexation of Crimea, public opinion was not prepared for the possibility of a serious war in Ukraine. People saluted the bloodless annexation of Crimea but were against the direct participation of Russian regular troops in a real war. Now the propaganda is launching the idea that confrontation with the West and a fight against our enemies is the only way to ensure national survival. A serious war is possible. And that is a very important and dangerous thing.
Is it possible in Russia today to oppose the official propaganda narrative?
The effectiveness of propaganda is supported by increasing repression, which decreases activists’ ability to advocate an alternative point of view. The Boris Nemtsov murder is a very widely known incident. But very few people know that there is a group of political activists who have received anonymous calls threatening their lives for a long time. Before Boris’s murder, these threats looked like the acts of mentally ill people, but it looks much more serious and has a stronger effect in today’s political climate. This is the how the political landscape is gradually changing. The task of the regime is to teach people that much more things are possible then they thought, to accustom them to a much higher level of coercion and violence.
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