US policy toward Iraq is floundering. While President Obama’s strategy to degrade and defeat the Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL, Daesh) has failed, partisan aspersions—blaming Bush for the initial Iraq invasion or Obama for allowing the Islamic State to resurrect itself by withdrawing precipitously and then ignoring Syria—do not substitute for a strategy to counter the problems emanating from Iraq today.
When it comes to policy formation, however, garbage in leads to garbage out. A strategy that is based on false assumptions about Iraq will only make matters worse. Over at Commentary, I take on eight myths and assumptions about Iraq that corrupt policy formation. These are:
- Iraq is an artificial country (false)
- Dividing Iraq is a solution (false)
- ISIS is the result of political failure in Baghdad (false)
- The Iraqi Army didn’t fight at Ramadi (false)
- The “Surge” was a long-term strategy that promoted stability (false)
- Prime Minister Maliki was always an Iranian plant (false)
- Arming Sunni tribes or Kurdish Peshmerga directly will help rather than hinder the fight against the Islamic State (false)
- Working with Iran to defeat the ISIS is a US or Iraqi interest (false)
There is no magic formula to defeat the Islamic State, and it cannot be done on the cheap. Many of the solutions put forward by lobbyists for the Kurds or Sunni states might sound good on the surface but often they would lead to disastrous second and third order effects. Simply put, policy prescriptions based on false notions about Iraq, sectarianism, and the fight against the Islamic State will only catalyze greater instability and bolster both ISIS and Iran. It’s been more than 12 years since Operation Iraqi Freedom began; it’s long past time to put these myths to bed.
from AEI » Latest Content http://ift.tt/1H1oUHT
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