U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry (L) speaks with Hossein Fereydoun (C), the brother of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif (R), before the Secretary and Foreign Minister addressed an international press corps gathered at the Austria Center in Vienna, Austria, July 14, 2015. REUTERS/US State Department/Handout via Reuters
One of the worst aspects of the Iran deal is the timeline by which Iran gets upwards of $100 billion in sanctions relief, unfrozen assets, and new investment, all in a matter of months. Secretary of State John Kerry and senior State Department officials delude themselves if they believe that the preponderance of that windfall won’t go into Iran’s export of revolution:
- First, history suggests that is the case. The last time Iran received a similar hard currency windfall, Supreme National Security Council chairman Hassan Rouhani invested the bulk of the money in covert nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
- Second, ideology matters. If Middle Eastern rulers operated upon the principle that the economic well-being of their people trumped political ideology, then the region might look a lot more like Singapore than Syria.
- Lastly, the structure of the Iranian government privileges the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). New investment will disproportionately go through IRGC-run companies and banks, and support the activities of that terror-sponsoring group, even if the Iranian leadership were sincere.
While Iran hasn’t gotten its largest tranche of money yet, Kerry, for whom leverage seems to be a dirty word, gave them billions of dollars up front just to sit at the table with him. Now it seems that the IRGC is using some of that money to take regional destabilization to a new level.
Back in February 2011, protests erupted in Bahrain both because of the unfilled elements of the National Action Charter (which was meant to address sectarian and political grievances which had fueled unrest in the 1990s) and because of the spirit of the Arab Spring. An ill-considered and counterproductive crackdown using lethal force only made matters worse.
While some factions within the Bahraini government sought to blame Iran for sparking the unrest (as the Iranians had in 1981), the 2011 protests were largely indigenous, even if the Iranian government and media did encourage them. On December 30, 2013, and then again earlier this summer, Bahraini authorities intercepted Iranian weapons shipments meant for opposition groups in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Now, Bahraini authorities have announced a third weapons intercept.
Frustration at the slow pace of reform in Bahrain does not excuse violence nor the revolution that Iranian authorities seek to precipitate in the island nation. Nor is the acceleration of Iran’s challenge to Bahrain arbitrary. Bahrain hosts the US Fifth Fleet, and forcing the US Navy out of the Persian Gulf remains a consistent theme of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s rhetoric. Even if he does not succeed in that, transforming Bahrain into the battlefield for a sectarian war with Saudi Arabia appears to be something Khamenei and Rouhani are willing to risk. After all, if they are willing to fight Israel to the death of the last Palestinian and Lebanese, why not fight Saudi Arabia to the death of the last Bahraini?
Iran will receive the huge windfall Kerry agreed to deliver this year through a combination of his arrogance, naïveté, and atrocious skill at negotiating. If the escalation of Iranian attempts to sabotage Bahrain are any sign, however, then the situation will get very bad very fast once that money is delivered.
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