The answers to these questions will be determined, in no small measure, by American policy toward South Asia. The candidates’ responses will suggest how well they understand the issues in a region that is home to 1.6 billion people, or about a fifth of the world’s population.
Nearly a quarter century after it began dismantling the shackles of Nehruvian socialism, India’s vast economy remains a work in progress. According to the World Bank, India is now the world’s third largest economy at $7.4 trillion in purchasing power terms. But in real terms, India’s $2 trillion economy — the ninth largest in the world — remains relatively small for a country with 1.2 billion people.
This vast potential suggests that the world’s third $10 trillion economy—after the US and China—will likely be India. For the past decade and a half, successive US presidents have officially backed India’s rise. Successive presidents, and bipartisan majorities in both houses of Congress, have rightly seen a democratic and pluralistic India as a natural counterweight to both Chinese dominance and the rise of radical Islam. But India cannot realistically be expected to play a larger role in Asia while it remains an economic underperformer. What can the US do to increase the likelihood that India will live up to its economic potential? Are there lessons to be applied from successful US economic policies toward Japan, South Korea and Taiwan during the Cold War?
Over approximately the past decade, US-India trade in goods and services has quadrupled to about $100 billion, but that’s less than a sixth of US trade with China. For the US, India ranks only eleventh in goods trade, between Taiwan and Saudi Arabia. Vice President Joe Biden and Secretary of State John Kerry have both said that the US and India should aim for bilateral trade of $500 billion.
Yet economic ties between the two countries are often held hostage by narrow interests and stunted ambitions. At present, neither Washington nor New Delhi is even talking about a free trade agreement, and India is not part of ongoing negotiations to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). What might a new US administration do to better align its economic goals with its strategic goals? Apart from pursuing a free trade agreement, should India be encouraged to join TPP?
As China continues to flex its economic and military muscle, Asia’s democracies are looking to deepen ties with the US. What should the next administration do to reassure friends in the region that the US remains committed to peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and will back its words with sufficient diplomatic and military resources? In addition to traditional treaty allies such as Japan, Australia and South Korea, how can the US use its closer ties with India—democratic, but not formally aligned with any country—to ensure that Asia continues to enjoy the peace and prosperity that have allowed it to develop over the past four decades?
President George W. Bush is widely credited with elevating US-India ties to a strategic level by signing a deal for civilian nuclear cooperation in 2005. How should the administration build on his legacy? One suggestion is to bolster both trade ties and Indian defense manufacturing capacity by working collaboratively on large military projects such as aircraft carriers. Is this something the next administration would support? Is it a good idea to attempt to revive the so-called quadrilateral of democracies—the US, Japan, India and Australia—despite Chinese objections? How do you see the security architecture of Asia evolving?
Instability in Pakistan and Afghanistan shows that the US cannot simply “pivot” away from the dysfunction of the Middle East and the Islamic world toward the dynamic economies of East Asia. So far the Islamic State has made only marginal inroads in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but the group’s pan-Islamic appeal and sophisticated media operations—along with concerns that the Iran deal will boost Shiite power—suggest that this could change. And India will not be able to engage fully with East Asia while it worries about turmoil to its West.
Meanwhile, the Taliban continues to launch attacks in Afghanistan. It remains to be seen how the recently announced death of Mullah Omar will affect the Taliban’s ability to fight, or its willingness to negotiate a peace deal with Kabul. And though the Pakistan army has had some success taming the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) over the past year, it has so far shown no inclination to go after other terrorist groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Haqqani Network, both of which it has historically nurtured.
How will a new administration approach the threat of radical Islam in South Asia? Should the US reconsider President Obama’s decision to wind down the US combat presence in Afghanistan? Should drone strikes be stepped up or reduced even further than in recent years? What can the US do to ensure that women’s rights in Afghanistan are not surrendered to a resurgent Taliban, and to nudge Pakistan toward becoming a responsible nation that gives up support for jihadist groups in both Afghanistan and India? The new administration’s approach to radical Islam in the region ought to be part of a larger global effort, but at the same time tailored to specific local conditions.
Despite being the world’s third largest Muslim-majority nation after Indonesia and Pakistan, Bangladesh is not really on US policy radar screens. But the government in Dhaka is in the midst of a struggle with radical Islamists and their supporters whose outcome will affect the stability of the entire region. Bangladesh under secular Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, daughter of the country’s founder, has challenged not only terrorists but also their supporters in the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami.
In April, Bangladesh executed a senior Jamaat-e-Islami leader for war crimes committed during the country’s independence struggle more than four decades ago. But instead of applauding Dhaka’s efforts to close a traumatic chapter of its past, the Obama administration has been lukewarm.
Bangladesh presents the US with a dilemma. Ms. Hasina is a flawed leader who quashes domestic dissent, but she is also realistically the country’s best bet against a slide toward greater radicalization. Should the US keep its distance from the Bangladesh government lest it eventually lose power to an angry opposition? Or should it help bolster Sheikh Hasina for providing an ideological alternative to the Islamist call to regulate all aspects of the state and society by the harsh tenets of Sharia law? The recent murders of a Bangladeshi-American blogger—hacked to death in Dhaka by Islamic vigilantes—underscore the fragility of secularism in Bangladesh. The next US president will almost certainly need to pay the country more attention than the current one has.
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