Southeast Asia is of growing importance to the United States. Unlike a number of countries in East Asia, those of Southeast Asia have healthy demographic profiles and the potential for robust economic growth. And as China seeks to expand its diplomatic influence and military power throughout the Asia-Pacific region, this sub-region is increasingly becoming a center of geopolitical competition. More and more, America’s own economic prospects and security concerns will be tied to the success or failure of US policy in Southeast Asia.
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry delivers a speech on U.S.-Singaporean relations and U.S.-Asia trade and investment policy on August 4, 2015, at Singapore Management University in Singapore, Singapore. US Dept of State, Flickr.
1) How will you balance US security interests and US values in Southeast Asia?
Geostrategic and economic dynamics are driving a number of Southeast Asian countries to draw closer to the United States. Washington has largely welcomed the trend and is taking its own steps to enhance ties to the region. But while the region plays host to some democratic success stories — notably the Philippines and Indonesia — freedom for many in Southeast Asia is still limited. Vietnam and Laos are communist dictatorships. Malaysia, Singapore, and Cambodia are essentially one-party states. Coup-prone Thailand is now ruled by a military junta. Democratization in Burma remains uneven at best. Is the strategic imperative to draw closer to Hanoi, for example, at odds with US goals regarding political liberalization and the protection of human rights in that country? Is it possible to increase pressure on Burma to adopt true democratic reform without driving Naypyidaw back into the Chinese camp?
2) Is the South China Sea a “core interest” for the United States?
Chinese officials reportedly first described the South China Sea as a “core interest” in 2010 during private meetings with top US diplomats. Chinese “core interests” are, presumably, those interests that Beijing prioritizes above all others and over which it is least willing to compromise. Then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was quick to fire back, stating at an Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit, “The United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea.” To date, the Obama administration’s policy has suggested otherwise, as there has been little notable reaction to China’s seizure of Scarborough Shoal, its attempt to starve out Philippine marines on Second Thomas Shoal, or its building (and quite possibly imminent fortification) of islands in the South China Sea. Are freedom of the seas and international order at risk in the South China Sea? Are these waters as important to the United States as they are to China?
February 2014 map indicating China’s territorial claims in the South China sea. Reuters, W. Foo, February 13, 2014.
3) What will be your approach to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations?
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has made important strides towards greater regional economic integration. It is also an effective convener, and stepped up US participation in regional summitry has been a positive development during the Obama years. ASEAN, however, has proven itself ineffective at managing maritime tensions, which makes the administration’s persistence in encouraging ASEAN to take the lead in doing so misguided. This inefficacy is due, in large part, to Beijing’s willful (and apparently successful) efforts to sow divisions within the organization. This is especially problematic for an organization that operates based on consensus. What is the proper role for ASEAN in America’s approach to Southeast Asia? Is it time for the United States to foster a new grouping—whether formal or informal—that can better tackle the region’s most pressing security challenges?
4) What are Southeast Asia’s “swing states”?
Given limited time and resources, it will not be possible to equally pursue deeper relations with all of the region’s countries. Indonesia is the region’s giant and has enormous economic potential, but it has been overly cautious in pursuing badly needed economic reforms and in drawing closer to the United States. Vietnam may be most able and willing to stand up to China, but its repression of human and civil rights makes a closer US-Vietnam relationship both difficult and distasteful. The Philippines and Thailand are treaty allies, but the former is weak while the latter may be at the start of a prolonged period of democratic backsliding. Singapore is strategically located, but while it is relatively strong, it is absolutely small. Which countries are most central to the pursuit of US objectives in the region? How will you prioritize America’s relations with the region’s states?
5) Assuming the Trans-Pacific Partnership has been concluded, what will be your economic priorities for Southeast Asia?
When completed, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) will be the world’s largest free trade area and will include four Southeast Asian nations: Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam. But it will not include Indonesia’s 250 million people or Thailand’s $374 billion economy. And while poverty has consistently trended downwards across the Asia-Pacific in recent decades, more than 60% of the Laotian population lives on under $2 per day, as does more than 40% of the populations in Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. What steps, if any, will you take to promote deeper economic ties with those countries outside the TPP and to support development in the region’s poorest states?
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