This blog series analyzes the most important Iran news events of the past week and provides an outlook of the regime’s strategic calculus.
Turkey and Iran have historically maintained cordial and generally cooperative relations, but the evolving conflict in Syria may be stretching the limits of Turkish-Iranian cooperation. In Syria, Turkey has been supporting Ahrar al-Sham, an ally of Al Qaeda affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra, against the Iranian backed regime of Bashar al-Assad. Supplies, intelligence, and weapons heading to those groups presented a challenge to Iran’s Syria policies, but Turkey’s decision to launch strikes against Islamic State (ISIS) — and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) — targets in Syria represents an important shift in the conflict.
Rebel fighters from the Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement walk on a hill in Jabal al-Arbaeen, which overlooks the northern town of Ariha, one of the last government strongholds in the Idlib province May 26, 2015. REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi.
The Turkish decision has been repeatedly criticized by Iranian leaders. On July 29, Major General Hassan Firouzabadi, Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff Headquarters Chief, called the airstrikes against the Kurdish group a strategic mistake, while alleging Turkey’s support for ISIS. A few days later, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian tried to emphasize Iran and Turkey’s “strategic relationship,” but explained Turkish moves were a violation of sovereignty. The Supreme Leader’s Senior Foreign Policy Advisor was more frank:
Turkey is helping the terrorists. America has publically admitted that it has created camps for some of the terrorist groups that America considers moderate. But one cannot divide terrorism between moderates and extremists. Terrorism is terrorism.
The expanding conflict has also had repercussions for trade and movement across the Iranian-Turkish border. Since July 9, nine attacks have occurred on Iranian vehicles travelling in Turkey, including multiple freight convoys, and a bus carrying Iranian tourists. The attacks sparked the closure of at least two border crossings and have led to cancelling train services between the two countries. Tehran warned Iranian citizens to avoid travel to Turkey and complained that Turkey is devoting insufficient security support to the Iran-Turkey border.
The attacks are curious. On August 16, for example, unknown gunmen fired on two Iranian trucks and torched them, but none of the drivers were harmed. Moreover, no group has claimed credit for any of the incidents. Turkey attributes the violence to the PKK, but Iranian officials seem less certain. Deputy IRGC Commander Brigadier General Hossein Salami couched the attacks as an issue of Turkish competition with Iran, rather than one with the PKK:
If Turkey attacks the PKK or does not take military action against them, in either case, this is to our benefit. Turkey wanted to become a regional power against us: however, its influence does not extend more than ten kilometers into Syria and the Muslim Brotherhood is also finished.
Some speculative reporting indicates Turkey itself may be somehow involved in the attacks, which could explain Iran’s increased eagerness to discuss the broader regional situation with its neighbor. Iran officially requested Turkey respond to the “systematic attacks” on Iranian vehicles and citizens, and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has made a concerted effort to meet with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Zarif’s efforts have been compromised by an unrelenting Iranian media campaign bent on exposing Turkey’s links to ISIS, including recent reports from Iran’s Press TV that Erdoğan’s daughter visited wounded ISIS militants. Zarif’s visit to Ankara was postponed when key Turkish officials, including Erdoğan, were suddenly unavailable following the Press TV reports.
With no obvious culprit, the attacks will continue to fuel suspicion and conspiratorial theories among the IRGC and other Iranian leaders. The PKK could very well be responsible. Also possible culprits are Iranian Kurdish separatists (the Party of Free Life Kurdistan or PJAK) who could be exploiting greater freedom of movement and cross-Kurdish group cooperation in Turkish territory as the PKK and Ankara escalate their fight. Iran may even fear Israel or the United States have a hand in stirring up violence against Iranian interests through the Kurds, which has been a frequent complaint by Tehran in the past.
Repairing and advancing Iran’s regional relations is a key objective of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani following the nuclear deal. Iran knows that finding a political solution to the civil war in Syria and halting attacks on Iranian assets in Turkey will require Turkey’s buy in. If given a chance, Iran will seek to deescalate and mend ties. Tehran does not want another bitter zero-sum contest, like it has with Riyadh now. A workable relationship with Turkey is far more important to Tehran than the public relations value of a bitter media campaign.
J. Matthew McInnis is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Tara Beeny is a research assistant at the American Enterprise Institute. This report was produced in cooperation with the Iran Team of the Critical Threats Project. It analyzes the most important Iran news events of the past week and provides an outlook of the regime’s strategic calculus.
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