Congress fought a bruising legislative battle in order to ensure its right to review the Iran deal, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. But like the dog that caught a car, Congress now faces the question of what to do with it. Should there be a straight up or down vote on the totality of the deal? A resolution of approval that goes down in flames? A resolution of disapproval that repeats the litany of broken promises and dangers outlined on so many editorial pages over the last weeks
Arguments over the right course are bogged in a miasma of misinformation, disinformation and plain partisanship. But Congress’ decision should be simple: The right course is to secure a bipartisan vote that, yes, rejects the deal in its current form, but doesn’t stop there. Straight rejection is the wrong call. Instead Congress should send the president back to the negotiating table with the outlines of a deal that the representatives of the American people can accept; a deal that actually secures the positive outcomes the Obama administration now claims.
What would the outlines of such a revised deal be? Many, including at times the president himself, Secretary of State John Kerry and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have laid out the parameters of an agreement with Iran that, while not optimal, would at minimum be acceptable. These provisions include, among other things, a genuinely phased agreement linked to performance, an end to research and development on advanced centrifuges, a sharper reduction in operating centrifuges, shuttering the underground facility at Fordow and the Arak heavy water reactor, shipping out Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile, anywhere-anytime inspections, and, most important of all, no lapse of Iran’s obligations after 10-15 years.
No matter what, these are the outlines of the deal Congress must demand, even understanding that members are in an uncomfortable situation. The president will use the very loopholes in Iran sanctions legislation that Congress afforded him to deliver promised rewards to Iran. Dispassionate observers have noted logically that if Congress didn’t want a president to waive Iran sanctions, they shouldn’t have given him waiver authority.
Nor is the Corker-Menendez review process established by Congress a masterpiece of legislative legerdemain: Any resolution of disapproval stopping concessions to Iran will take effect only if approved by a veto proof majority. This is the bill that Congress put forth. The White House didn’t draft it.
Even the treaty arguments put forth by many are weak: The Iran deal was not negotiated as a treaty, and that decision is the president’s alone. Indeed, in increasingly partisan times, as Kerry rather impolitically told the Senate Armed Services Committee, it’s no surprise that a president would prefer the unilateralism of an executive agreement to the Senate supermajority required to approve a treaty. Nor is it correct to suggest that “reservations” – objections and modifications — of the kind that the Senate is within its rights to append to a treaty ratification document are precedents for rejecting the Iran deal. Reservations simply enumerate limitations on America’s obligations under the treaty; they typically don’t force the reopening of a treaty negotiation.
Other than the practical implications of laying out a better deal, another reason to do so is to decisively crush the administration’s main line of defense for its concordat with Iran: This deal or war. War has never been in the cards, and the suggestion is dishonest. Having a positive vision of an Iran without nuclear weapons is a wise course for a Congress that has strayed too far from the foreign policy leadership – think NATO expansion, or lifting the Bosnian arms embargo — that was once its writ.
Mr. Obama has suggested that Congress is fantasizing if members believe that either the Iranians or the other parties to the deal will accept modifications. And because of that, he insists, it’s a take it or leave proposition. While he may be correct, the reality is that if Iran doesn’t wish to sign on to a better deal, U.S. unilateral sanctions can still effectively limit even European cooperation with Iran. Bans on dollar transactions can constrain Iran’s oil trade, and limit the $150 billion windfall now headed Tehran’s way. And bans on weapons sales and ballistic missile work will certainly hinder Iran’s conventional weapons efforts.
Finally, no matter the outcome, it will be a net good for the Republican leadership of both houses to reach out to their Democratic counterparts and seek comity on an Iran resolution—especially since so many Democrats are also leery of the deal. The White House has made its case to Democrats on partisan grounds – this is a Democratic president and you must support him. Frankly, many Republicans would like a straight repudiation (rather than a more complex exhortation for a better deal) for similarly partisan reasons. But partisanship is not a foundation for better foreign policy. It is in the interests of all who care about American leadership in the world to ensure that any new Iran resolution is not the national security version of the Affordable Care Act – a wedge that forever drives the parties apart.
This is not a hard choice: There is common ground on Capitol Hill on the question of Iran. Finding it, and sending it to the president, is the right call. It’s a strategy that may not end in victory, but it is certainly well worth the effort.
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