The Strategic Studies Institute recently published A Hard Look at Hard Power: Assessing the Defense Capabilities of Key U.S. Allies and Security Partners. Edited by Gary J. Schmitt, codirector of the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at AEI, and featuring contributions from him, AEI scholar Michael Mazza, and others, it fills critical gaps in information “about the actual hard power resources of America’s allies.”
Even though the alliance between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States is strong, the ROK is increasingly asserting responsibility for its own defense. Bruce E. Bechtol explains that rejecting American assistance may not be the smartest move for Seoul:
While keeping its distance from the kind of cooperation on missile defenses undertaken by Japan and the United States, South Korea is moving forward with its own missile defense upgrades; in a recent budget, the defense ministry indicated it intends to spend nearly 14 percent of its entire budget on improving its missile defense capabilities…
More ambitiously, Seoul plans to establish a Missile Destruction System by 2020. According to reports, the system will be designed to detect imminent North Korean missile launches and enable South Korea to strike missile sites before an attack can be carried out. According to South Korean sources, the system will involve “spy satellites, surveillance drones for monitoring and attack systems, including missiles, fighter jets and warships.”
US Army missile air defense artillery batteries are seen at US Osan air base in Osan, south of Seoul April 5, 2013.
Indeed, it appears that a key reason the United States and South Korea negotiated new, more lenient guidelines to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR) in 2012 was to give the ROK the option of deploying longer-range missiles and more sophisticated drones to cover all of North Korea. Under the previous MCTR 2001 agreement, South Korean missiles were limited in range to no more than 186 miles.
With the new accord, South Korean missiles will have a maximum range of 500 miles, which is sufficient to give them the capability of reaching any area of North Korea from launch points well south of Seoul and the DMZ. Although the new agreement regarding missile range adds to Seoul’s ability to target key nodes in the North, actually doing so would be both an expensive undertaking and a capability the United States already provides. In addition, it will do nothing to enhance badly needed improvements in ROK ballistic missile defense capabilities.
The fact remains that the missile defense systems currently deployed by the South Koreans are inferior to those currently deployed by the United States and Japan. If the ROK had simply purchased the systems American experts recommended, such as the PAC-3 and SM-3, South Korea would be better prepared for a ballistic missile attack from North Korea. In addition, by joining a U.S.-led BMD system, the South Koreans would have access to the U.S. Navy’s X-Band radar and the U.S. Army’s land-based radar associated with the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense.
The U.S.-led system links together the capabilities of detection and destruction systems around the globe and matches them up with mobile BMD platforms such as Aegis-equipped ships. By going its own way when it comes to missile defense, the South Korean government is limiting its ability to defend itself and its citizens.
Download A Hard Look at Hard Power: Assessing the Defense Capabilities of Key U.S. Allies and Security Partners here.
This post was written by Ash Malhotra, an AEIdeas intern, and edited by Sarah Gustafson, Editorial Assistant at the AEIdeas blog.
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