Is peace within reach in Colombia?

Key Points

• Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos has made major concessions to reach an agreement with leftist narcoguerrillas and end a 50-year conflict.
• After a recent breakthrough on an ambiguous “transitional justice” plan for holding guerrillas and soldiers accountable for crimes, Colombians for the first time appear optimistic about reaching a negotiated peace settlement.
• Since the announcement of the plan, the guerrilla commander has raised questions about the “justice” agreement and the six-month deadline, stirring public skepticism.
• The United States should help its Colombian allies pursue and secure a lasting peace by continuing antidrug programs to eradicate coca, extradite kingpins, punish cocaine smuggling, and expose Venezuela’s narcostate.

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Hoping to end the 50-year armed conflict in Colombia that has claimed more than 220,000 lives, President Juan Manuel Santos in 2012 launched negotiations with the armed guerrilla group known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). In spite of deep skepticism among many Colombians, Santos staked his legacy on reaching a comprehensive agreement to end the war; demobilize the guerrilla army; and adopt economic, political, and social reforms demanded by the FARC. If such an agreement can be secured and enforced, a peaceful Colombia has much to gain from political stability and economic growth.

In late September, the two sides agreed on a framework for bringing guerrillas and soldiers to justice for crimes and set a six-month deadline for completing the negotiations on other critical issues. Santos already has begun to sell the deal to the Colombian public and to propose modalities through which the Congress of Colombia will scrutinize and implement the accords. However, it is not clear how he will honor his commitment to submit the agreement to a popular referendum.

In the days after the announced breakthrough, the FARC commander disputed the government’s interpretation of the forms of punishment available under the “transitional justice” accord and expressed doubts about the six-month deadline. Such ambiguities will fuel a vigorous public debate and test whether 40 million war-weary Colombians are prepared to trust the FARC to end its criminality and to count on Santos to enforce the accords.

The United States has supported its key ally in South America in pursuing this agreement. However, indulging this peace process may seriously hinder US-backed antidrug efforts. After many years of decline in its cocaine production, Colombia recorded a nearly 40 percent increase in coca cultivation last year, and some contend that Colombia has recovered its place as the world’s primary cocaine producer.[1]

As part of the peace talks, the Colombian government has ended aerial spraying of coca plantations, pulled back from offensive operations against the FARC’s extensive drug-smuggling activities, defined FARC narcotrafficking operations as political crimes that could be covered in an amnesty, and pledged to cease extradition of FARC personnel sought in the United States. As coca production increases, if the Colombian government ignores continuing FARC drug activities to preserve peace, the United States and many countries harmed by narcotrafficking will pay a very dear price.

“We Want Peace”

President Santos owes his June 2014 reelection—in which he garnered not quite 51 percent of the valid votes—to the simple slogan “Queremos la paz” (We want peace). In the first round of balloting, flagging poll numbers led the president to a second-place finish. His opponent, Óscar Zuluaga—a stern, conservative senator who was handpicked by Santos’ predecessor and mentor-turned-rival Álvaro Uribe—railed against the FARC talks. Santos counterpunched by making the election a choice between war and peace—reenergizing his base and attracting the support of voters far to his left. In the runoff a mere three weeks later, Santos more than doubled the number of votes he received—from 3.3 million to 7.8 million—beating Zuluaga by approximately 900,000 votes.

Santos can cite that victory as a mandate for peace—notwithstanding polls revealing persistent popular doubts about the process. Since the inception of formal peace talks in September 2012, the Colombian public has questioned the FARC’s good faith. Critics have objected to prolonging the negotiations despite periodic guerrilla attacks, insisted the guerrillas face justice, and rejected FARC figures’ participation in postconflict politics. Santos is betting that a specific plan for ending the conflict will sway a majority of Colombians to support the process over the objections of opponents, who are led by the popular former president Uribe.

Santos’ determination made the difference in reaching the recent breakthrough, managing doubts within the military, and pushing the FARC to take the process seriously. As recently as July, the government’s chief negotiator, respected former Vice President Humberto de la Calle, admitted that a wave of deadly FARC attacks earlier this year had brought negotiations to their “worst moment.”[2] A poll released in early July revealed declining support for the talks, with more Colombians (46 percent) favoring a military solution over continued negotiations (45 percent)—an 11-point swing since April away from the peace process.[3]

Even before his reelection, Santos made the talks a personal priority, delegating domestic challenges to his ministers. Some say that his obsession with securing an agreement puts the government at an inherent disadvantage in the negotiations. Although Santos is desperate for a deal, the FARC is in no hurry to give up their lucrative narcotrafficking operations, which actually benefit from the prolonged talks and ceasefire.

The government’s negotiating position may also be weakened by Santos’ misunderstanding of the FARC commanders’ motivations. The president believes, justifiably, that the FARC already has been strategically defeated by the Colombian military’s sustained efforts; he sees the negotiations as an honorable and orderly way for the guerrilla commanders to reach a denouement after a five-decade struggle. However, many would argue that the FARC’s preeminent role in South America’s cocaine trade has long ago eclipsed their revolutionary objectives as a priority. That being the case, the ongoing talks and the government’s concessions on aerial spraying of coca are very good for the FARC’s criminal enterprise. An accord requiring them to lay down their weapons and end violence and criminality is not.

What motivates the FARC? Established in 1964 as the military wing of Colombia’s defunct Communist party, the FARC has waged a brutal war against the government—costing the lives of 180,000 civilians and 40,000 fighters and displacing nearly five million people from conflictive zones.[4] Operating primarily in rural areas where the government historically had little or no presence, the guerrilla group employs violence and criminal tactics that have imposed a heavy burden on the Colombian people. Among these are forced recruitment of minors, bombing public spaces, kidnapping for ransom, sexual violence, extortion, illegal mining, and assassinations.

Twenty years ago, the FARC played a supporting role to cocaine producers and smugglers, imposing a “war tax” on traffickers on their turf and guarding clandestine airstrips and laboratories. They gradually became directly involved in the illicit operations—cultivating coca, transiting precursor chemicals and cocaine, and laundering illicit profits—with an international network of partners in Venezuela, Central America, Mexico, and beyond. Today, narcotrafficking is the FARC’s lifeblood, deriving as much as $3.5 billion a year, according to a 2012 estimate by the Colombian government.[5]

Despite the FARC’s political origins, decades of deep involvement in the drug trade have overtaken its original ideology and objectives. For that reason, serious questions remain as to the FARC’s willingness to accept or abide by any peace deal requiring it to forfeit massive revenue that is an alternative means of survival and political power. In the past, the guerrilla group has taken advantage of ceasefires and the Colombian government’s attempts to negotiate, stringing the negotiations out for as long as possible to increase recruitment and buttress their military capabilities. Today, billions of dollars are at stake, which are more important than ever precisely because the FARC has been defeated strategically.

Even assuming that FARC Commander Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri (known by the nom de guerre Timochenko) and the other FARC negotiators are sincere in their efforts, the FARC’s structure and operations cast doubt on their ability to bind the organization to a peace agreement. The FARC has an estimated 6,300 fighters plus 20,000 more persons who provide logistical support—many of whom benefit directly from the FARC’s illegal activities.[6] Relying on data discovered on captured computers and documents belonging to guerrilla commanders, Colombia’s military intelligence determined that, of the FARC’s 67 fronts throughout the country, only 15 were strictly following orders from central command.[7]

On numerous occasions, the FARC has demonstrated significant internal divisions and a lack of command authority. The most damning incidents are the unauthorized military actions by FARC elements in violation of ceasefires from the current negotiations.[8] In January 2014, following the detonation of a motorcycle bomb that killed 1 civilian and injured 20 others, the FARC’s central command published a statement on its website saying it “repudiated and condemned” the actions of those responsible for the attack.[9] In the wake of the attack, Santos complained publicly of the FARC’s “irrational and contradictory” actions.

Last November, guerrillas from the FARC’s northwestern bloc kidnapped Colombian Brigadier General Ruben Dario Alzate, stirring national outrage and forcing President Santos to halt peace talks until Alzate’s safe return two weeks later. Analysts commented that the recklessness of kidnapping such a high-ranking official during negotiations suggested that regional FARC leadership dissatisfied with the peace process likely made the decision.[10]

Early this year, a wave of attacks launched by FARC guerrillas—including a bloody ambush of sleeping soldiers on routine patrol in April—drew widespread condemnation from Colombians and brought negotiations to the brink of collapse. These attacks suggested either the commanders’ complete disregard for the outcome of the talks or the FARC leadership’s inability to maintain order within its ranks, meaning that they lack the necessary control to compel all FARC fighters to comply with any agreement.[11]

Another aspect that has sown doubts among the Colombian people is the central role being played by the leftist governments of Venezuela and Cuba, as the talks are being held in virtual secrecy in Havana. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s decision in August to summarily expel thousands of Colombians from border towns, with the stated purpose of controlling illicit smuggling, further undermined support for the talks.[12] Venezuelan authorities’ increasingly evident complicity in drug trafficking has led many to question how one of the FARC’s coconspirators in narcotrafficking can serve as guarantor of any peace process.[13] This connection was made apparent recently when Maduro admitted that Venezuela shuttled Timochenko to Havana in September on a government plane.[14]

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Notes

1. Jeremy McDermott, “Is Colombia Again the World’s Top Cocaine Producer?,” InSight Crime, May 6, 2015, http://ift.tt/1DY8K0I.

2. “El proceso de paz de Colombia está en su ‘peor momento’, dice el gobierno” [The Peace Process Is at Its “Worst Moment,” Says the Government], BBC Mundo, July 5, 2015, http://ift.tt/1G1t0sh.

3. “Encuesta: Baja apoyo a diálogos de paz con las FARC” [Poll: Support Drops for the Peace Dialogues with the FARC], El Nuevo Herald, July 1, 2015, http://ift.tt/1M6VLrp.

4. “Colombia Civil Conflict Has Killed ‘Nearly a Quarter of a Million’: Study,” Telegraph, July 25, 2013, http://ift.tt/1LoBVgF.

5. Geoffrey Ramsey, “FARC ‘Earns $2.4 to $3.5 Billion’ from Drugs, Says Colombian Government,” Christian Science Monitor, October 25, 2012, http://ift.tt/RYnLTi.

6. “Colombia and the FARC: Treading Carefully,” Economist, March 28, 2015, http://ift.tt/19UQckD.

7. Daniel Rivera Marin, “Una muy afilada Espada de Honor” [A Very Sharp Sword of Honor], El Colombiano, January 5, 2013, http://ift.tt/1LoBVgI.

8. “La cúpula de las Farc no controla sus frentes” [FARC Leadership Doesn’t Control Its Fronts], Vanguardia, January 25, 2014, http://ift.tt/1M6VJzy.

9. “Divisions Erupt in FARC: Colombian Rebels Criticize Their Own Amid Peace Talks,” Yahoo News, January 24, 2014, http://ift.tt/1M6VJzB.

10. “Kidnapping Reveals FARC’s Internal Divisions,” Stratfor, November 22, 2014, http://ift.tt/1LoBSBF.

11. “Cómo fueron los 64 atentados perpetrados por las FARC en los últimos dos meses” [These Were the 64 Attacks Perpetrated by the FARC over the Last Two Months], Infobae, July 17, 2015, http://ift.tt/1M6VLHL.

12. Hannah Dreier, “Colombians Who Fled Violence Stunned by Venezuela’s Anti-Immigrant Crackdown,” US News & World Report, August 27, 2015, http://ift.tt/1LDPTeg.

13. José de Córdoba and Juan Forero, “Venezuelan Officials Suspected of Turning Country into Global Cocaine Hub,” Wall Street Journal, May 18, 2015, http://ift.tt/1FoLSG8.

14. “Maduro admite que el jefe de las FARC viajó a Colombia en un avión oficial venezolano” [Maduro Admits That the Leader of the FARC Flew to Colombia in an Official Venezuelan Plane], ABC.es, September 28, 2015, http://ift.tt/1M6VJzJ.

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