This has been a pivotal year for Colombia’s negotiations with the narcoguerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
In the past year, the talks went from what the government’s chief negotiator Humberto de la Calle described in July as its “worst moment,” to President Juan Manuel Santos saying just this week that “we have never been so close to peace,” alluding to a breakthrough on the issue of reparations for the conflict’s victims. The talks are on pace to wrap up by the agreed deadline of March 23. In addition, on Monday, the Colombian Congress approved a plebiscite to seek public approval of the agreement, as polls show overwhelming support for the process.
Colombia’’s President Juan Manuel Santos speaks to the nation following the latest, historic step in the peace talks with FARC rebels in Havana, Cuba at the presidential palace in Bogota, December 15, 2015. REUTERS/Cesar Carrion.
Santos has been rightfully commended for his pursuit of an agreement to end the 50-year armed conflict in Colombia that has claimed more than 220,000 lives. However, as I told the US House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere last week, I fear that disproportionate concessions and apparent eagerness of the government to conclude an agreement may leave Colombia vulnerable to a resurgence in illicit trafficking and unprepared to address the numerous complications that will arise from the agreement.
Once a bulwark of US counter-narcotics efforts, Colombia has reclaimed the unfortunate distinction of being the world’s largest producer of cocaine, with a 50+ % increase in coca production in 2014. The Santos government’s decisions to gut the highly effective aerial spraying of illicit coca crops and to end the extradition to the United States of indicted FARC drug traffickers are two troubling concessions in the peace talks.
In my testimony, I also warned that, “As difficult as the peace negotiations with the FARC have been for Colombia, the post-agreement period will provide even more challenges. If an agreement is reached, Colombia will have to absorb thousands of FARC guerrillas, most of whom have little or no education or work experience. The government will also have to expand its presence to provide services, develop, and stabilize parts of Colombia that have been deeply affected by the conflict.”
There is also the challenge of dealing with those in the FARC who refuse to end their lucrative involvement in the cocaine trade — which garners an estimated $600 million annually. As with past agreements, the government will be hard-pressed to punish guerrilla leaders who commit new abuses by continuing their criminal enterprises. Enforcing the accords so they work for the majority of Colombians will require the kind of hard-nosed approach that is not typical of Santos. If the FARC commanders continue to enrich themselves with narco-dollars, they will have the means to buy the political influence they could not win on the battlefield. As their influence undermines Colombia’s political institutions and the rule of law, the expected peace dividend in the form of economic growth and foreign investment may fail to materialize. Instead, the country’s commerce and industry could be squeezed out by a powerful underground economy that writes its own rules.
These developments and the remaining uncertainties beg the question of whether Colombia is letting down its guard again. No one can begrudge war-weary Colombians the opportunity to end a long, violent chapter in their history. However, their US allies should warn against trading prosperity and security for an unsustainable truce with criminals. Past generations of Colombians have made that mistake and paid the price.
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