I’m not fond of the Sunni-Shia rift narrative. For one thing, it is beloved to extremists of all stripes, in both Tehran and in the al Qaeda and ISIS heartlands. For another, it advances the paint by numbers regional analysis so beloved to the intelligence community and those who know little of the region. You know, they’ll never cooperate because one is Sunni and the other Shia (so said the CIA re: al Qaeda and Iran), or the all-Shiites-are-fifth-columnists-for-Iran theory, or the regional favorite — that the Middle East is in the midst of an epic war of the neo-Ottoman vs. the neo-Persian Empires.
Flames rise from Saudi Arabia’s embassy during a demonstration in Tehran January 2, 2016. Iranian protesters stormed the Saudi Embassy in Tehran early on Sunday morning. REUTERS/TIMA/Mehdi Ghasemi.
It’s not that each theory doesn’t have elements of truth. It’s that the whole sweep-of-history, clash-of-civilizations school ignores so much about the Sunni and Shia worlds that has nothing to do with religion or sect, but more to do with governance, economics, opportunity, development and all those things that seem to have faded before the gods of hyphenated self-identification. As my colleague Michael Rubin writes ably on our blog, there is plenty of blame to go around regarding Sheikh Nimr al Nimr’s execution, much on the Saudi side. But the reality is that facts are increasingly irrelevant to the Middle East’s leaders.
Here are some of the possible knock-on effects of the Middle East’s growing sectarian divide:
1)Growth in Iran’s influence. Yes, it’s been said before. And it’s a little obvious too. But truth be told, Iran was in a bad place when the Arab Spring began, as democratic revolutions (no matter their sectarian coloring) are anathema to the Islamic Republic’s dictatorship. The fall of Assad would have lost Tehran the only Arab ally it had. Splits within its terror proxies meant a weakening reach. And had some of the protests in places like Bahrain led to needed liberalization, Iran’s spurious pose as Shia champion might have been shattered. But now, with the slavering enthusiasm of team Obama, things are looking up for Tehran, whose fingers are in pies from Lebanon to Syria to Yemen to the West Bank.
2) The radicalization of Saudi Arabia. Remember the Saudi Arabia that thought it could up Wahhabi fortunes by backing the Taliban and al Qaeda? The Saudi Arabia that was the number one source of terrorist financing in the world? That Saudi Arabia believed that it could pull the strings of the Sunni Islamic world, interfere at will, and manage the outcome. So wrong… And yet after an interlude of international cooperation, moderation within Saudi Arabia and diminution of support for extremist Islamist groups under the late King Abdullah, the bad old days are back.
Don’t blame poor King Salman, who’s not there, but his Crown Prince. (For more on Nayyef, see Rubin’s post.) But note: this is the Saudi Arabia that marched into Bahrain to “settle” matters between the Sunni kingdom and its Shiite majority. That headed into war in Yemen with no evident strategy for victory. (Yes, Iran was there first and deserves the lion’s share of the blame. But this is what we expect of Iran.) That’s helping in Syria by supporting al Qaeda related groups. Ugh.
3) The return of the dictators. Remember Qadhafi and Mubarak and Assad? (Ted Cruz and Rand Paul and Donald Trump do.) At their hands, a generation of liberals and moderates, billions in economic growth, and so much more simply disappeared. Out of their rule came the Arab Spring, and now the turmoil in the region. But dictator nostalgia is running high, and a new generation has arisen in Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el Sisi. Don’t fool yourself; these men won’t keep the peace and aren’t moderates in the political, economic or religious sense. They are simply another chapter in the endless change of the dictatorial guards.
4) More proxy warfare. If you like Hezbollah, you’re going to love the next few years. Hamas. All the players in Syria. The proxy armies in Iraq. The various Kurdish militias. Iran has been the leader in this means of arms-length warfare, but many others — the Saudis, the Turks, the Qataris, the Emiratis — have joined in. In some cases, supporting a proxy is the best plan if a country is not itself willing to fight on the ground. But once unleashed, such groups have a tendency to keep finding new missions for themselves. “Resistance” has many forms.
5) A growth in Russian influence. Pace Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin is no powerhouse in the Arab world. His strength is directly proportional to the weakness of the United States. Feel free, by the way, to make the transition: US weakness is no longer “perceived”; it is real.
6) Weapons proliferation. If you’re in for a long war, you need the better weapons to fight it. Everyone is on a buying spree, and for the Obama administration, if you’re not Iran, the only sign of love is a juicy package of weapons from America.
There’s plenty more, but this is a good start. Oh yes, this is also bad for Israel, Christians, secular Muslims, liberals, women, rule of law and prosperity.
from AEI » Latest Content http://ift.tt/1IOVSgf
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