While the roots of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, ISIS, Daesh) may predate the Iraq War, it was its rapid conquest of Mosul, Tikrit and other Sunni Arab-populated areas in Iraq that brought it to the forefront of the policy debate. At first, the White House dismissed ISIS as “the jayvee team.” As, however, the group consolidated control, forced the Christian community to flee their homes, enslaved Yezidis, declared a caliphate and threatened both Baghdad and Erbil, US policymakers refined their policy. On September 10, 2014, President Obama announced a new strategy “to degrade and ultimately destroy” the Islamic State. Nearly a year later, however, ISIS remains in control of large swaths of both Iraq and Syria, and will probably continue to control significant territory into the next administration. How candidates answer the following questions should elucidate how they understand the Islamic State, the threat it poses, and what strategy the United States should pursue:
An Iraqi helicopter flies over a soldier in Husaybah, in Anbar province July 22, 2015. Iraqi security forces and Sunni tribal fighters launched an offensive on Tuesday to dislodge Islamic State militants and secure a supply route in Anbar province, police and tribal sources said. Reuters
Who was responsible for the rise of the Islamic State?
Foreign fighters might have flocked to Iraq and Syria, but were they alone responsible for the rapid rise of the Islamic State inside Iraq? Would the Islamic State have taken hold had the United States not precipitously withdrawn from Iraq? At the same time, could the Islamic State have succeeded in seizing Mosul, Tikrit, and other territories without the buy-in of some Sunni tribesmen, Baathists, and veterans of the Saddam-era Iraqi army? Subject to debate, however, is this: whether Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s sometimes sectarian policies precipitated the Sunni Arab Iraqis’ rejection of Baghdad, or whether ideological refusal to accept the empowerment of Shi‘ites preordained Sunni cooperation with the Islamic State. The question of motivation is important. To believe political grievances to be responsible for the rise of the Islamic State implies that the resolution of those grievances, for example with a more magnanimous policy in Baghdad, would undercut Sunni support for the Islamic State. However, it would not explain the rise of the Islamic State in an exclusively Sunni country like Libya, nor the resonance that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s call for a caliphate has had with foreign fighters from more than 90 countries. Regardless, should Baghdad make concessions to Sunnis under fire?
Likewise, while sectarianism is an issue, is the root of sectarian discord Shi‘ite discrimination against Sunnis, or rather Sunni rejection of Shi‘ite political power? Who, for example, has been responsible for dozen of car bombings in Baghdad, both before and after the rise of the Islamic State? Could cooperation between senior Baathists and the Islamic State suggest that Iraqi Shi‘ite leaders were right all along that re-integrating Baathists into the government would pose a security risk? The Sunni tribes might not have been alone in having enabled the rise of the Islamic State. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) may have provided some weaponry to the Islamic State, in order to use them as a means to weaken the Maliki government (with whom the KRG was locked in contentious negotiations.) This raises a broader question about whether the KRG is committed to defeating the Islamic State entirely, or merely driving it out of territory the Kurds hold or seek. The answer to this impacts the nature of US aid and assistance.
Should the United States directly arm the Kurds and the Sunni tribes?
After the Iraqi Army withdraw from Fallujah in the face of a withering Islamic State assault, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter suggested the problem was that the Iraqi army lacked the “will to fight.” That may not have been accurate, but critics are right to point out that, after the United States spent upwards of $20 billion training a new Iraqi army, many of its top officers not only initially fled the advance of the Islamic State but they also abandoned their equipment to it. Against the backdrop of the Iraqi Army’s failures, the rise of the often sectarian Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces), and the accusations (often false) that the Iraqi government has prevented supply of weaponry to the Kurds, many analysts and US politicians argue that the United States should directly arm Sunni tribes and the Kurdish Peshmerga.
So, would you supply weaponry directly to the Sunni tribes and Peshmerga? How would you ensure that Sunni tribes and Kurdish political parties actually use the weaponry for its intended purpose? After all, the Kurdistan Regional Government has largely stockpiled the weaponry it has received for political reasons, the reason why many Sunni tribes have defected to the Islamic State. What would this mean for Iraqi unity? And what impact would such a strategy have on the willingness of the Iraqi central government to work with the United States? Otherwise put, might direct provision of weaponry to Sunni tribes actually exacerbate sectarianism by giving pro-Iranian factions in Baghdad a populist advantage? Just as important, what strategies would you suggest for decommissioning the newly-armed tribal and Kurdish units (or Shi‘ite volunteers) after fighting ends?
Is Iran a partner?
Increasingly, U.S. airpower seems to support with Iranian-backed militias fighting the Islamic State. While the defeat of the Islamic State might be a noble goal, is it wise to coordinate with Iranian-backed militias as opposed to the more centralized Iraqi army? While the United States and Iran might share the goal of the Islamic State’s defeat, at what point do their interests and vision diverge for a post-Islamic State order in Iraq? What are the disadvantages of working with Iran in Iraq?
Will ground troops be necessary to defeat the Islamic State?
Air power has been central to President Obama’s strategy to defeating the Islamic State, but it has failed to achieve its goals. While the Islamic State has suffered some setbacks, the territory under its control is now larger than when the president announced the beginning of an air campaign. Will US ground troops be necessary to defeat the Islamic State? If so, how many and what types of ground forces should return to Iraq, and what should their mission be? Should an Authorization for the Use of Military Force in Iraq be written narrowly to prevent mission creep, or should it provide American forces re-inserted in Iraq with expansive powers?
Can the United States live with the Islamic State?
This may sound like a ridiculous question , but in many ways it represents the elephant in the room. So, under your administration, would you seek to eradicate the Islamic State in its entirety and, if so, under what time frame? Or would you be satisfied with containing the Islamic State? Would your goal be to eradicate the Islamic State in Iraq only, or would any comprehensive strategy also have to address the safe-haven the Islamic State has found in Syria? In other words, is victory in Iraq possible without also addressing the chaos emanating from within Syria?
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