AEI’s director of Russian studies, Leon Aron, has edited a new volume— to be released at a conference on May 14— on the dynamics of Russian domestic politics titled “Putin’s Russia: How it rose, how it is maintained, and how it might end.” This work looks beyond international sanctions and the war in Ukraine to examine underlying crises in Russia’s political and economic systems that will determine the stability of the Putin regime in the years ahead. Below, Dr. Aron interviews one of the nine leading Russian experts that contributed to the volume, Mikhail Dmitriev, president of the consulting firm New Economic Growth, about his chapter on the evolving social values and political attitudes of Russian citizens. For additional information about the volume and the conference where the authors will discuss their findings, check out the event page here.
Unlike most observers, both Russian and foreign, you emphasize in your essay that it was not the middle class but other demographic groups that were “becoming the key engine of democratization demand” in Russia. Could you, briefly, explain?
In 2013, the demand for political change began to shift from Moscow to other regions. At times, other regions even surpassed Moscow in their aspirations. Thus, a political system other than liberal democracy was the preferred option for 46% of Moscow’s residents, but for only 32% nationwide. The greatest demand for democracy was in St. Petersburg (69%) and other cities with more than one million people (59%). Even in smaller cities and rural areas where the modern middle class comprises an insignificant proportion of the population, the demand for democracy reached 38–39%, thus exceeding the national capital’s level. Similarly, the share of Muscovites who voted for United Russia stood at 74%, compared to 67% across Russia.
By 2013, similar trends also affected attitudes toward public protests. While in 2011 Moscow led the protests against unfair elections, in mid-2013 only 21% of Moscow’s residents were willing to protest an unfair election as compared to 26–30% of residents in cities with less than one million people, and 25% of rural residents. The gap in willingness to take part in economic protests was even more drastic, with 15% in Moscow versus a 43% nationwide average and 63% in cities with more than one million people. Moreover, as the share of Muscovites supporting legislative restrictions on street protests exceeded the percentage opposing such restrictions, three-quarters of all respondents across Russia opposed the law. Thus, in a brief span of time Moscow appeared to have lost its role as leader of the campaign for political change, while its middle class morphed into a kind of anchor for the political status quo.
If this demand for democracy has really grown outside of Moscow, as our data suggests, then its source is definitely not the middle class alone. The share of the middle class outside Moscow was about one third of adults, and that in rural areas is about one quarter. Meanwhile polling shows that more than two thirds of Russians outside Moscow demand liberal (“free”) or limited democracy. This means that mass demand for democracy outside Moscow stems not only from the middle class but from the less well-to-do and socially developed strata of society.
These results support an opinion already widespread among scholars: demand for democracy is not an immanent feature of the middle class; it is strongly affected by specific socio-economic and political circumstances. For example, a sizeable part of the Russian middle class is employed by the public sector. Advantages that such employment offers them can be closely related to the absence of political competition, and that may weaken the demand for democracy on their part.
In the same essay, you predicted that “a deteriorating economy will trigger protest waves.” So far, this appears not to be the case. Why?
By the end of 2014, the priorities of Russians shifted towards current consumption and risk minimization. This shift was influenced by the conflict in Ukraine, the economic crisis and a widespread perception of external threats. It was also accompanied by a weakened interest in the mass public protest characteristic of 2011-2012 and even by an increasingly negative attitude towards the protest events of that period. According to the Public Opinion Fund (FOM) poll conducted in October of last year, the general propensity to protest was low at 2%—a figure that was 6 times lower than the 2011 level.
At the same time, however, the willingness to participate in protests for economic reasons (low wages and pensions, high prices and utilities tariffs) was found in the red (danger) zone according to the FOM classification – 18-20%, which is 9 to 10 times higher than the propensity for political protests.
A survey by the Levada Center conducted on February 20-23, 2015 showed that residents of Moscow considered the likelihood of economic protests in their city more probable than other Russian citizens. According to survey, 48% of Muscovites thought economic protests were possible, that is, 1.5-2 times higher than the estimates in other localities. Meanwhile, in February 2015 among Muscovites the Sberbank index of financial sentiments, dropped well below the historic minimum and was significantly lower than that of the residents of other regions (respectively 54.7 and 74.6 percentage points, with the normal level around 100 points. (The index includes assessment of the current and future economic situation as well as demand for foreign exchange and preference for bank deposits as opposed for keeping cash at home.)
These data indicate that the economic protests related to the current recession are likely to intensify. Usually economic protests begin with a lag and reach the peak of intensity near the exit from recession. This is what happened during the crisis of 1990s and during the recent recession of 2008-2009. Then the largest wave of economic protest occurred in May-June 2010 when the economy was already in a state of recovery. There were 22,176 largely economic protests in those two months, the vast majority of which were held outside Moscow.
So, economic protests are likely to intensify once again, but this will probably happen with some delay, not before autumn this year.
If you were to name, say, the three most fateful (significant) processes in Russian politics and society today, what would they be?
The Ukrainian conflict, economic crisis, and shift of priorities from development issues, (that is, demand for better health, education, housing, and efficient government), to current consumption (incomes, social transfers, like government pensions, subsidies and other benefits, and inflation) and domestic threats (economic crisis, income decline, currency devaluation, and unemployment).
Could you outline, very briefly, how each of them might be shaping Russia’s future in short or medium term?
Two fundamental factors that predetermined the latest backward shift of Russians’ social priorities and political preferences are the international conflict in Ukraine and the economic crisis.
They are both temporary, even if in the worst-case scenario they can go beyond the medium term. As to achieving a sustainable solution to the armed conflict in Ukraine, the probability of this seems significant. By contrast, the quick recovery from the economic crisis appears less likely, though its progress will depend on the evolution of the Ukrainian conflict.
In the end, the outcome of the Ukrainian conflict can be considered the main variable that will determine which of the two diverging medium-term scenarios will take place in Russia. The first scenario implies an eventual return of Russian society to the mainstream development agenda. It assumes an irrevocable cessation of hostilities in Ukraine that will reduce the relevance of factors related to external threats and increase the likelihood of a gradual lifting of economic sanctions against Russia.
In this case, the factor of defensive patriotism will be deactivated and return to a latent state. The support it gives to political ratings will weaken, while deteriorating perceptions of the economic situation will push political ratings down and reduce the influence of the state-sponsored media. With time, this can recreate the social and political environment which in many respects will be similar to the period of 2011-2012. The evolution of the socio-political situation prior to the next presidential election will largely depend on the ability of the political system to adapt and formulate a credible development agenda in response to public expectations.
The second scenario leads to the conservation of the survival agenda. It assumes that the extended armed conflict in Ukraine will perpetuate the economic crisis in Russia and prolong post-crisis stagnation. This will effectively lock up Russian society in an anti-modernization trap, by fostering a vicious circle of prolonged international conflict and economic underperformance. This environment will feed survivalist attitudes, a focus on current consumption and a besieged fortress mentality. It will also suppress the development agenda. Intense concerns about external threats combined with negative economic sentiments will support aggression towards foreign adversaries. Society will favor the country’s self-isolation. Supported by defensive patriotism, high presidential approval ratings may be sustained, while the influence of the official media could be maintained despite the downward pressure of negative economic sentiments. At the same time, dissatisfaction with the economic situation will boost protests.
Further into the future, the conflict fatigue and protracted economic depression could lead to the gradual erosion of support for the government and trust of the official media. The anger of the population will start to be more evenly distributed between external enemies and internal targets, such as officials and ethnic migrants. Opportunities for continued economic growth will be limited due to both continued economic sanctions and restricted technology transfer from advanced economies. This scenario raises the risk that Russia will be locked in a middle income trap with slow economic growth and social stagnation.
Should the West care about these developments (after all, they are Russia’s “internal affairs”) and if so, why?
The important point is that the recent developments in Russia need not be interpreted as proof of a fundamental value divide between Russia and the West which cannot be bridged over time through economic and social development. On the contrary, the current state of Russian society may be considered a sort of detour on the mainstream path of convergence with the advanced economies. The peaceful resolution of the Ukrainian crisis and exit from economic recession will facilitate the refocusing of Russian society on the mainstream modernization agenda and will allow it to resume convergence with the advanced economies.
Is there anything the global community can do to facilitate Russia’s progress?
The West need not be tempted to slide into a confrontational mentality towards Russia. Such an attitude will only invigorate isolationist and counter-modernization forces inside Russia and will complicate the resumption of economic and social convergence with the advanced economies.
It is also essential to remain as open as possible to intense human contact at a grass roots level.
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