Mexico’s Cycle of Crime and Corruption

Key Points

• Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto’s plan to prioritize a social and economic agenda above security issues was never realistic, and crime across the country shows that his security policy is failing.
• If Mexico is going to take its place as a prosperous country in a globalized world, it will have to invest both political capital and money to build a criminal justice system that will apply the rule of law against violence and corruption. Economic prosperity is not possible without security.
• A better security strategy in Mexico will enhance security and prosperity in the United States as well. Mexico must drive the effort, but the US should partner with the nation, particularly in confronting organized crime.

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The escape of notorious drug kingpin Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán from a Mexican prison in July 2015 was dramatic evidence of the chronic government corruptibility at the heart of Mexico’s security crisis. President Enrique Peña Nieto’s bold declaration a year before that El Chapo’s possible escape would be “unforgivable” ended up revealing his misunderstanding of his country’s vulnerable criminal justice system.[1]

Any informed observer of Mexico’s security challenge over the last several decades can recite the unfinished business of bringing organized crime and corruption under control: fundamental reform of government institutions in all branches and at all levels, criminal justice reform, and professional security forces that can impose the rule of law without fear or favor. That is a daunting agenda, but Mexico cannot reach its full economic potential in this 21st century without a modern state that can protect people and property.

Some of the country’s recent presidents adopted internal security strategies as a priority, and others have focused on economic and social reform, hoping that the rule of law would improve as Mexico modernized. Despite the fact that the vast majority of Mexicans are demanding public security, too many of their political leaders at all levels are either unwilling or unable to fight corruption and entrenched interests in favor of the rule of law.

Mexico is at a crossroads today. Although Peña Nieto began his presidency trying to emphasize economic modernization over security issues, today it is clearer than ever that it is impossible to build prosperity without security. Mexico’s political class has the responsibility to rally the nation behind the rule of law to rescue their country from corruption and criminality.

New Approach, More Failure

Even before taking office in December 2012, President Peña Nieto sought to distance himself from the strategy of his predecessor, Felipe Calderón (2006–12), who waged a frontal assault on organized crime. Peña Nieto instead focused on a host of economic and social reforms to modernize Mexico’s economy. On the security front, he emphasized intelligence-driven law enforcement, greater cooperation from security agencies, and fighting high-impact crimes (murder, kidnapping, extortion, and robbery) that directly affect the civilian population.[2]

Although Mexican officials today argue that drug violence is not a countrywide phenomenon, the past year has been marked by deadly episodes—including massacres and assaults on security forces—in rural states and key urban areas alike.[3] Meanwhile, high-impact crimes continue to afflict much of the population, aggravated by the continued ineffectiveness or corruption of police, notably on the state and local level.

Over the years, Mexican authorities have had some success in dismantling large drug cartels, which has produced mixed results. When a large criminal syndicate is fractured, the continuing activities of splinter gangs can complicate security efforts.[4] Additionally, debilitating one syndicate has a tendency to strengthen others by reducing competition, allowing them to consolidate their presence and increase their operations in Mexico and beyond. For example, the Sinaloa Cartel, Los Cuinis, and Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación have actually benefited from effective police action against their competitors.

Suppressing high-impact crimes that affect personal security, which was Peña Nieto’s stated approach, is particularly difficult because it requires professional local law enforcement; lacking professional policing, such crimes have grown worse in recent years. For example, in the first two years of the Peña Nieto administration, kidnappings increased 52.7 percent.[5] A 30 percent increase in kidnappings from May to June of this year shows no sign of improvement.[6]

Statistics on executions by criminal groups demonstrate that impunity is rampant and worsening. According to Lantia, a Mexican consulting firm that specializes on security issues, in the 31 months of the Peña Nieto administration, 23,758 executions have been reported. According to an article in Excelsior, “Between June and October of 2014, executions related to organized crime were recorded at around 520-530 per month.”[7] However, the average for 2015 has increased to 636 executions per month.[8]

In addition to these data, a succession of violent events in a number of states throughout the country have demonstrated that the federal government’s security policy is failing.[9] Instead of improving the situation, Peña Nieto’s original passive approach exposed the extraordinary weakness of institutions and the widespread corruption at the state and local level. As security crises have flared up around the country, as a last resort, Peña Nieto has used presidential authority and federal resources to impose order. This ad hoc response is no substitute for a coherent, comprehensive strategy.

One of the first security tests for Peña Nieto came in the state of Michoacán, which has been wracked by turf battles among a number of criminal organizations: the Knights Templar, La Familia Michoacana, Guerreros Unidos, Los Rojos, and Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación. Beginning early in 2013, so-called self-defense groups began to push back against the criminal gangs in the absence of effective policing by state or local authorities. In January 2014, the vigilante groups made international headlines when they began to occupy cities and block roads, ostensibly to disrupt drug traffickers’ operations. This crisis spiraled out of control because of the dysfunction and corruption of state authorities; a succession of governors from two different political parties have been accused for years of criminal associations with rival drug syndicates. Negative press attention eventually forced Peña Nieto to intervene, assigning a federal commissioner to replace the governor and deploying security forces to mitigate the damage.

Within months, Peña Nieto was forced to intervene in the states of Mexico and Tamaulipas when local authorities were unable to contain outbreaks of violence. In Mexico state, he increased the presence of the federal police and the army, and federal authorities devised a strategic security plan to quell the violence.[10] In Tamaulipas, the federal interior minister was ordered to implement a new security plan that carved the state into four security zones, managed by federal commissioners.[11]

Perhaps the most dramatic example of lawlessness occurred in Iguala, a small city 120 miles south of Mexico City in the tumultuous state of Guerrero. In late September 2014, 43 students at a nearby teachers’ college were expected to stage a protest that might disrupt a public speech by María de los Ángeles Pineda, wife of Iguala Mayor Jose Luis Abarca. According to the initial investigation, the students were detained by local police and turned over to Guerreros Unidos, a local drug gang with whom the mayor’s wife purportedly had ties; the gangsters reportedly tortured and executed the victims and burned their bodies.[12] The mayor and his wife were immediately detained, and the state governor was forced to resign under pressure from the federal government and civil society.

The thus far fruitless search for the remains of the murdered students took a grisly turn when investigators discovered a number of clandestine graves that contained the remains of unknown victims. The atrocity brought international attention and sparked a series of protests in Mexico’s principal cities. Peña Nieto and federal authorities have not been able to satisfy the demands for justice surrounding this case, which was a devastating reminder of the corruption and dysfunction that hobbles Mexico’s criminal justice system.

More evidence that the criminal threat has not subsided came in May of this year, when the government launched a security operation in the state of Jalisco against the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación and Los Cuinis. Within hours, the gangsters were able to mobilize more than 500 men in coordinated counterattacks, shooting down a military helicopter; burning 11 banks, 5 gas stations, and 36 buses; killing 15 people; and injuring 20 others. They also blocked 12 highways affecting the central states of Jalisco, Colima, Guanajuato, and Michoacán.[13]

When he took power, Peña Nieto was determined to shelve Calderón’s confrontational approach; however, he never produced an alternative strategy. As a result, the effect of Peña Nieto’s new security policy has been less of the same. He has continued to confront the cartels, but not as part of a broader strategy. He has continued to use the army, but has failed to provide the legal framework for the military to operate. He promised a professional police force, but has failed to pay for it. He has drafted a host of criminal justice reforms, many of which have not been approved or implemented. The result has been criminal organizations that are acting more boldly to confront a state that is not committed fully to the fight.

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Notes

1. In a February 2014 interview for Univision, President Enrique Peña Nieto told León Krauze that if Guzmán escaped again it would be “unforgivable.” See Enrique Peña Nieto, interview by León Krauze, Univision, February 26, 2014, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gvs8qGrA1Co.
2. Enrique Peña Nieto, “Recuperar la paz y libertad de los mexicanos” [Restoring the Peace and Freedom of Mexicans], El Universal, May 14, 2012, http://ift.tt/1LSqaPh.
3. Roger F. Noriega, “Showdown in Jalisco Exposes Mexico’s Faulty Antidrug Efforts,” American Enterprise Institute, May 5, 2015, http://ift.tt/1RasSAd.
4. Doris Gómora, Dennis A. García, and Marcos Muédano, “Cárteles, la nueva era” [Cartels, The New Era], El Universal, May 18, 2015, http://ift.tt/1LSqaPi.
5. Paris Martínez, “El secuestro se dispara 52.7% durante la gestión de Peña Nieto,” Animal Político, March 24, 2015, http://ift.tt/1y0PLKt.
6. Fabiola Martínez, “Cifras oficiales revelan un aumento en los casos de secuestro denunciados” [Official Figures Show an Increase in Reported Cases of Kidnapping], La Jornada, July 22, 2015, http://ift.tt/1LSqaPm.
7. Leo Zuckermann, “31 meses del sexenio de Peña: 23,758 ejecuciones” [31 Months of Peña Nieto’s Administration: 23,758 Executions], Excelsior, August 10, 2015, http://ift.tt/1gXm9vW.
8. Ibid.
9. Roger F. Noriega and Felipe Trigos, “Why Isn’t Mexico’s Security Strategy Working?,” American Enterprise Institute, June 12, 2014, http://ift.tt/1zKD6SF.
10. “Ante la violencia, el gobierno federal active ahora el ‘operativo Edomex’” [Because of Violence, the Federal Government Activates ‘Operation Edomex’], CNN Mexico, March 31, 2014, http://ift.tt/1pBoR9j.
11. “Los comisionados en Tamaulipas” [The Commissioners in Tamaulipas], Hoy Tamaulipas, May 19, 2014, http://ift.tt/1LSq8a9.
12. David Agren, “Mexico: Burned Bodies Likely of 43 Missing Students,” USA Today, November 7, 2014, http://ift.tt/1uJcdvg.
13. Roger F. Noriega, “Showdown in Jalisco Exposes Mexico’s Faulty Antidrug Efforts,” American Enterprise Institute, May 5, 2015, http://ift.tt/1RasSAd.

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